Europe’s preparedness will only be as strong as its vaccine and biotech base

Europe cannot afford to rediscover preparedness only when the next crisis arrives. COVID-19 exposed deep vulnerabilities in health security, manufacturing capacity and supply chains, but the lesson goes far beyond a single pandemic. We now live in a world of overlapping crises: geopolitical conflict, climate pressure, and resource scarcity are contributing to medicine shortages, antimicrobial resistance, and a growing risk of emerging infectious diseases. The old distinction between “here” and “elsewhere,” or between “temperate” and “tropical” diseases, is fading. As global mobility persists, outbreaks spread faster, supply chains fracture more easily, and resilience has become a defining test of European sovereignty.

Europe starts from a position of strength. It has a world-class scientific base, excellent universities, leading research institutes, and strong support mechanisms for early-stage innovation, from Horizon Europe to the European Research Council. It also has a proud heritage in vaccinology and has long been a global centre of vaccine research, development and manufacturing.

Yet scientific excellence alone is not enough. Europe’s enduring weakness lies in translation: too often, promising research fails to become scaled industrial capacity, advanced clinical development, or readily deployable medical countermeasures.

This gap is particularly visible in vaccines. Vaccine R&D faces a steep “valley of death”: proof of concept arrives late, manufacturing is complex, investment cycles are long, and commercial incentives are uncertain—especially for pathogens without established markets.

At the same time, Europe struggles with fragmented capital markets, a limited pool of specialist growth finance, and administrative hurdles that slow clinical trials and scale-up. If Europe is serious about preparedness, it must better support the transition from laboratory promise to manufacturing reality.

The creation of HERA in 2021 was an important political signal. It recognised that preparedness cannot be a one-off reaction but must become a permanent European function. Yet HERA’s mission now needs to be matched by sustained funding, stronger coordination powers and a clearer long-term industrial interface.

There has been meaningful progress. Under the Preparedness Union agenda, the Commission has advanced strategies on stockpiling and medical countermeasures, alongside instruments such as HERA Invest and EU FAB’s “ever-warm” manufacturing capacity.

The Global Health Resilience Initiative further underscores priorities such as resilient supply chains, local manufacturing and vaccination. These initiatives point in the right direction—but they must be fully resourced, better integrated, and anchored in long-term industrial realities.

This is why the Biotech Act matters so much. It is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to move from strategy to true industrial policy. To succeed, it must align the entire innovation chain—from research and clinical development to manufacturing, procurement and deployment. It should also address a structural mismatch in EU funding frameworks: innovative biotech companies often fall between categories, too large to qualify for SME support but too small to compete globally with established pharmaceutical players.

The Biotech Act must also deliver regulatory agility. During COVID-19, Europe demonstrated that faster, science-based pathways are possible. The priority now is to embed this flexibility in both crisis and non-crisis settings: accelerating clinical trial initiation, improving predictability, and reducing administrative burden without lowering standards. Speed is not only a crisis imperative—it is a competitiveness factor.

That competitiveness dimension is increasingly urgent. Global competition in biotech and vaccines is intensifying, with strong public backing in the United States, China and India. Europe risks losing investment, talent and manufacturing capacity unless it responds decisively.

The proposed Competitiveness Fund and initiatives such as BioTechEU are important signals, but their success will depend on delivering fresh capital, rapid deployment and user-friendly access. Critically, they must recognise the specific characteristics of vaccine innovation and enable blended financing models that support both SMEs and mid-sized innovators.

Vaccines are not simply another therapeutic category. They sit at the intersection of public health, industrial policy, resilience and global security. Their development and production require complex supply chains, long lead times and tailored procurement approaches. Their true value lies not only in responding to crises, but in preventing them. Europe should reflect this reality more explicitly in its policy choices.

Preparedness, however, cannot stop at Europe’s borders. Infectious diseases spread across continents, accelerated by travel and environmental change. Europe therefore has both an interest and a responsibility to remain a reliable global partner—through cooperation with organisations such as CEPI and Gavi and through support for regional manufacturing. Strategic autonomy and global solidarity are not in tension; in health security, they reinforce one another.

The conclusion is clear: there is no European preparedness without European industry. A resilient Europe requires a strong, innovative and globally competitive vaccine and biotech base. Preparedness is not just a health policy issue—it is an industrial, economic and geopolitical priority. The task now is to translate the lessons of past crises into sustained investment, effective policy frameworks and close collaboration between public institutions and the biotech sector.